After a decade of devolution and amid uncertainties about its effects, it is timely to assess and reflect upon the evidence and enduring meaning of any 'economic dividend' of devolution in the UK. Taking an institutionalist and quantitative approach, this paper seeks to discern the nature and extent of any 'economic dividend' through a conceptual and empirical analysis of the relationships between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation. Situating the UK experience within its evolving historical context, we find: i) a varied and uneven nature of the relationships between regional disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation that change direction during specific time periods; ii) the role of national economic growth is pivotal in explaining spatial disparities and the nature and extent of their relationship with the particular forms of spatial economic policy and decentralisation deployed; and, iii) there is limited evidence that any 'economic dividend' of devolution has emerged but this remains difficult to discern because its likely effects are over-ridden by the role of national economic growth in decisively shaping the pattern of spatial disparities and in determining the scope and effects of spatial economic policy and decentralisation.
More than a decade on from the initial constitutional and devolutionary reforms in the UK in the late 1990s, it is timely to assess and reflect upon the evidence and enduring meaning of the 'economic dividend' of devolution in the UK. Little research has been undertaken on this issue to date because it is a far from straightforward task, given the view that its impacts are "likely to be complex, subtle and difficult to measure" (Jeffery 2006: 1) . Thorny problems include: the contested conceptualisation of any 'economic dividend' and its relationships to other forms of dividend (social, political, cultural) ; the development of appropriate proxy measures relevant to particular national contexts; assembling available data of appropriate quality, historical coverage and international comparability; disentangling and isolating the effects of decentralisation; and, attributing causation amongst decentralisation's myriad relationships with broader economic and institutional change over time (Ashcroft et al. 2005; McGregor and Swales 2005) . Despite such challenges, the need to examine the evidence is pressing because it is recognised that "weakly supported" and "optimistic claims" for any 'economic dividend':
…drew heavily on academic research on a 'new' economic regionalism which was perhaps too quick to draw generalisations from a combination of The situation in Wales is illustrative of the resonance and inconclusive status of the issue. Accepting that it was the "dirty little secret" of devolution debates, the former Chair of the Yes Campaign in Wales acknowledged the lack of a necessary and directly causal connection between decentralisation and economic development and its geographical unevenness: "In fact…all the important economic indicators in Wales are going the wrong way. You could say there has been an economic dividend for
Cardiff, but not beyond that…The Labour Government has assumed that devolution is the recipe for economic development, but in fact it's just one of the ingredients"
(Kevin Morgan, Cardiff University, cited in Hayman 2008: 1). Further studies are required, then, especially given that while the economic benefits of decentralisation are "widely accepted amongst governments and international organisations alike, the empirical proof for this proposition remains scant" (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2009 : 2041  see also Balaguer-Coll et al. 2010; Tomaney et al. 2011 ).
The approach taken here integrates its institutionalist and quantitative analysis in the context of the unfolding histories of institutional, political and economic change over time and space within the particularity of the UK state. The argument is that analysis of any 'economic dividend' of devolution in the present needs to be rooted in the past evolutions of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation within the political-economies of particular nation states. The historical dimension of the analysis is critical in understanding the path dependencies that shape the evolution of working papers series 6 institutional structures and policy approaches over time and space, reflecting legacies of political choices, strategies and struggles.
With the aim of assessing and reflecting upon the evidence and enduring meaning of the 'economic dividend' of devolution in the UK over a decade after the institutional and political reforms introduced from 1997, the paper first addresses some conceptual issues in considering the relationships between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation. Despite the constraints of comparable data availability, the analysis then focuses upon the period 1984-2007 in an attempt to discern the existence (or otherwise), extent and nature of any 'economic dividend' arising from the inter-relation of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and devolution in the UK. Last, some conclusions and reflections are provided.
Spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation
Given its complex and unclear inter-relationships, the approach here situates the consideration of any 'economic dividend' arising from devolution within an understanding of the changing relations between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation. An evolution is evident in the ways in which spatial disparities are understood and explained with implications for how spatial economic policy and decentralisation are formulated and implemented. We discern stylised kinds of approaches -redistributive, free-market and growth-oriented -with different characteristics concerning their economic theory, causal explanation of spatial disparities, adjustment process, policy rationales and instruments, institutional working papers series 7 organisation, geographical focus and scope, political-economic project and language (Table 1) . Spatial economic policy is understood as forms of economic policy with spatial intent -such as regional or urban policy. We recognise the need and difficulty of disentangling this from economic policy without explicit spatial intent but with spatial implications -such as macro-economic, welfare or defence policy. We acknowledge too the more recent debates about 'spatially neutral' or 'blind' policy that is focused upon 'people' rather than 'place' and explains spatial disparity as the compositional outcome of sorting processes driven by rational economic agents (see, for example, Overman 2010).
Transitions in spatial economic policy reflect developments within economic theory and their differing causal explanations for spatial disparities and views of adjustment processes. These conceptual and theoretical ideas are then mediated and translated into policy rationales and instruments within the institutional structures of particular national political economies (Pike and Tomaney 2009 
An 'economic dividend' of devolution in the UK?
The UK provides the object of analysis and is an important case to consider the evidence and meaning of any 'economic dividend' of devolution for several reasons.
First, the UK has been marked by persistent spatial disparities, especially since the 1930s, which have endured and exerted significant influence upon the national political economy, politics and policy (Martin 1988) . Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of spatial disparities since the late 1960s and reveals the growing gap between London and the Greater South East and the other nations and regions in the UK.
Second, givens its experience of spatial disparities, the UK has a long history of development and experimentation with spatial economic policy, punctuated by institutional innovation, 'policy on' and policy off' episodes alongside ongoing, periodic scrutiny and reflection upon its principles and purpose (see, for example, Building upon Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004) and in the context of constraints in the backward reach of available data, we consider the historical evolution of spatial disparities and decentralisation but introduce a new dimension by augmenting the analysis with a quantitative measure of spatial economic policy. Further, given our emphasis upon the importance of economic growth in shaping the dynamics of the key variables, we investigate the implications of including the system's overall national economic performance in our analysis (i.e. national economic growth and national economic development). This issue has been identified as important in the fiscal federalism literature. For example, Oates (1999 Oates ( : 1142 suggests "it may well be that fiscal decentralisation itself has a real contribution to make to improved economic and political performance at different stages of development". In addition, aggregate economic growth may also be considered as a proxy for the kinds of allocative and productive efficiencies said to be generated by decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose et al.
2009).
As far as the data availability has allowed, the analysis has gone back to situate more recent changes in their appropriate historical and economic context. . Although the aggregate nature of data does not allow us to correct for differences in household composition at the single household level, we adopted a modified OECD equivalence scale in order to take into account regional differences in household composition and size generating different economies of scale. More precisely, the following formula consisting of the ratio between aggregate income earned by households resident in region j ( ) and a measure of aggregate population taking into account differences in household size and composition across regions ( ) eq. (1) has been applied in order to compute per head values of GDHI in region "j" ( ). The 1 The choice of GDHI per head as our dependent variable is not trivial and has important implications. The choice of regional gross disposable income per capita over the Gini index of GDP per capita has the advantage of including transfers of income from individuals, companies and government in the form, for example, of social benefits (European Commission 1999). But, on the other hand, "a region that has a low level of production might have a relatively high level of income due to large social security transfers, but it would still be a less favoured region" (European Commission 2004: 25-26 employees pension and social security contributions) and other current transfers paid (total secondary uses). Therefore, Policy is intended as a broad and regional version (by considering policy measures other than taxes) of the Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) index usually calculated to measure the progressiveness of tax systems.
Clearly, this measure theoretically ranges between zero (reflecting total ineffectiveness of state intervention in reducing spatial disparities) and the value of the Gini index relative to primary income 4 (reflecting the effectiveness of state intervention in reducing all spatial disparities characterising the distribution of primary income).
Challenging and enduring methodological issues are involved in calculating measures able to capture the degree of autonomy afforded to sub-national, regional and local levels of government through variegated forms of decentralisation (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2009; Torrisi et al. 2010) . The measure of fiscal decentralisation used is based upon the local to total general government revenue ratio (Fiscal Decentralisation) . This is a standard measure that is widely used in the international literature (Oates 1985 , Woller and Phillips 1998 , Akai and Sakata 2002 , Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2004 . It provides a proxy for capturing the decentralisation of fiscal powers and responsibilities to lower tiers of government beneath the national level. In common with other proxy measures it has some limitations. As a relatively narrow financial and quantitative measure, it is unable fully to capture the distinctive and variegated nature of decentralisation forms in particular national contexts. This is relevant in the UK, for example, with very limited and uneven decentralisation of revenue-raising powers in comparison with greater autonomy over expenditure in the devolved territories through the block grant mechanism. In addition, where decentralisation is focused upon legislative and policymaking rather than fiscal powers this measure can be limited.
However, here we are examining the value of this approach in considering the UK case in the context of our wider aim of international comparison of the historical evolution of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation. As a result, for our specific purposes this measure is preferred to alternative measures used elsewhere in the literature. First, an expenditure-based measure is not appropriate for our analysis because the share of local to total national expenditure is not statistically correlated with our measure of spatial disparities 5 and the data is not available across all EU member states. Second, the uneven nature of the devolution arrangements within the UK needed a measure capable of capturing the range from the weakest decentralisation in England to the strongest in Scotland. Third, alternative measures more explicitly taking into account institutional factors -such as the Regional 5 The Spearman correlation index between Gini and the share of sub-national expenditure in total expenditure is equal to 0.3727 with a p-value of 0.0961. Therefore, given these data, measurement and commensurability constraints as well as the particular context of the UK's highly centralised institutional setting, we argue that this measure is most appropriate for the aims of this study. and to better discern which factors may be related to shifts in growth patterns and to changes in policies we also consider changes in national economic performance (Growth). The rationale here is that all the variables considered are linked with the 6 We address the issue of the reliability of the devolution measure utilised in this analysis further in this section. At this stage both the "decrease in sub-national government autonomy" and the "massive rise in fiscal devolution" should be interpreted as if (our measure of) Fiscal Decentralisation would be able to reflect real change in the central-local relationship. and decline during recession, and the (statistically) neutral correlation between economic performance and local revenue generally protected during recession (see point (i) above).
< Table 5 about here> This analysis suggests that the critical causal relationship is between spatial disparities and national economic performance. Moreover, given the temporal lag in the relation between economic performance and other variables emerging from the analysis above, especially via total revenue (considering also that the correlation between its change and past change in economic performance is higher than the one with present economic performance, respectively 0.7370 and 0.5218), we hypothesise that economic performance could be the initiating factor and that other variables follow its 7 The results reported in Table 4 and 5 refer to the Pearson correlation index. However, when resorting to alternative indices, such as the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients, which allow for non-linear correlation, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients is, by and large, unchanged.
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21 movement with opposite dynamics and explanations. In other words, the interpretation of the empirical evidence of the relation between economic performance and spatial disparities is that -if not wholly driven by the economic cycle -the evolution of spatial disparities is strongly related to national economic performance, rather than the result of any 'economic dividend' of devolution. This analysis is based upon our chosen proxy for decentralisation which, while commonly used in the literature, is -as we have acknowledged -not without its weaknesses capture the whole set of overall relations between each other. Table 6 shows this correlation matrix. The correlations confirm and support the analysis above.
Nonetheless, some points are worth stressing. First, a rather counterintuitive positive overall correlation between spatial policy and spatial disparity (0.6201) is found.
Indeed, given the formula used to calculate our measure of spatial economic policy, ceteris paribus, an increase in regional disparities (Gini index relative to GDHI) will result in a decrease in the measure of spatial economic policy. This is what registered empirically, for example, during 1984-1986 with increasing spatial disparities linked with a decrease in the measure of regional policy. However, our analysis confirms that, overall, disparities in (primary) income before state intervention rose more than disparities involving GDHI -i.e. once measures of policy operated -generating a positive correlation between the spatial economic policy and spatial disparities.
Second, a negative overall correlation between decentralisation and spatial disparities (-0.4807) is confirmed. Fiscal decentralisation is likely to increase the degree of efficiency in the allocation of resources which may give rise to a spatially even distribution of income. However, further consideration of national economic performance and spatial polarisation indicators -combined with the analysis of correlations reported in Table 5 -shows that this interpretation could be misleading.
Indeed, considering the level and growth rate of national GDP, a strong correlation between spatial disparities, spatial polarisation and economic performance arises (for that the coefficient for Lagged growth is -statistically significant at 5% level -and slightly higher than the one for Growth (although not statistically significant at 5%) in both cases confirming the existence of a temporal lag between both spatial disparities and polarisation and their correlation with national economic performance.
< Table 6 about here > Overall, the interpretation here sees the negative correlation between regional disparities and devolution as a spurious one that could be explained in terms of the positive correlation between spatial disparities, spatial polarisation, and national economic performance combined with the negative correlation between economic performance and the share of local revenue (-0.3538 and -0.7517 respectively for Growth and Lagged growth) 8 . This evidence challenges the argument in favour of a "strong positive correlation between this measure of devolution and the downturn in regional per capita differentials" (Calamai 2009 (Calamai : 1140 and highlights the need for further investigation of the dynamic of the role played by economic growth and national growth poles. In terms of our analysis, these results have to be interpreted in the sense that the simultaneous consideration of the historical path of spatial disparity, spatial economic policy and devolution as separate variables is meaningful given that 8 An ADF test showed there was no co-integration between variables. 
Conclusions
More than a decade after the constitutional reforms of the late 1990s which began devolution in parts of the UK, this paper has sought to assess and reflect upon the evidence and enduring meaning of the 'economic dividend' of devolution in the UK.
Acknowledging the difficulties and methodological challenges involved in seeking to discern such a complex, subtle and difficult to measure entity ( The findings point toward the conclusion that even when it might be discerned, any 'economic dividend' of devolution is likely to be highly variable, taking different forms and degrees, and may be episodic or fleeting in its duration. It appears highly contingent upon particular paths of state institutional change across a range of scales and to be strongly shaped by national economic growth, the nature of fiscal autonomy and capacity and willingness for redistribution on the part of national central states.
This examination of the UK case highlights the difficulties of attempting to devise simple tests and of seeking to make more general and conclusive claims about 'economic dividends' resulting from devolution. Indeed, the particularities of the UK political economy -such as its lack of written constitution and relatively short policy regime duration -may even amplify and prolong such uncertainties. We acknowledge, however, that it might be that the timescale of our assessment may be too foreshortened and that much more than a decade needs to elapse before the effects of any 'economic dividend' become apparent. In addition, improvements are needed in data availability and methodological development to help create proxies and indicators able to capture the variegation of spatial economic policy approaches, forms of decentralisation and evolving spatial disparities in different national contexts in systematic and comparable ways. Despite these caveats, the study is worthwhile in contributing to the continued relevance of the concern with the economic and indeed other dividends of devolution that warrant further studies, especially international comparative work. Weak incentives due to lack of mechanism linking public spending with tax revenues raised within sub-national territories Lower coordination and compliance costs vis-à-vis the rest of the national territory
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Reduced coordination with the rest of the national territory with possible negative spill-over effects both on and from subnational territories Fiscal Decentralisation
